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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE
VIOLATIONS AND THE PURPOSEFUL ENFORCEMENT
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006)
Lisa A. Mattern*
Officers obtained a warrant to search for drugs and firearms in
Petitioner's home.' Although the officers announced their presence, they
waited only three to five seconds before entering the unlocked residence.2
Once inside, they discovered large quantities of drugs and a loaded
firearm.3 Petitioner argued that the premature entry violated his Fourth
Amendment rights, and he moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search.' The trial court granted his motion, but the Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that even when the knock-and-announce rule is
violated, suppression is unnecessary when the search is conducted
pursuant to a valid warrant.5 Petitioner was then convicted of drug
possession and appealed to the United States Supreme Court.6 The
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the Michigan
Supreme Court declined review.7 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari,' and, in affirming the Michigan Court of Appeals'
decision, HELD that knock-and-announce violations do not trigger the
exclusionary rule.9
The Fourth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."'" The

* This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Ken and Kathy Mattern, for their guidance,
encouragement, and love.
1. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.Cocaine rocks were found in Petitioner's pocket, and the loaded gun was discovered
between the cushion and the armrest of the chair where he was sitting. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.Petitioner was sentenced to eighteen months of probation. People v. Hudson, No.
246403, 2004 WL 1366947, at *1(Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2004), affid, 126 S.Ct. 2157 (2006).
On appeal, Petitioner once again raised his Fourth Amendment claim. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162.
7. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162.
8. Id.
9. Id.at2165.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generallyDavid E. Steinberg, The OriginalUnderstanding
of UnreasonableSearches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REv. 1051, 1062-71 (2004) (providing a
detailed history of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution).
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Amendment does not state how courts should protect this right. " However,
in Weeks v. United States, 2 the Court decided that evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment could be excluded in a federal criminal
trial.'3 This exclusion deters police from violating the Fourth Amendment
when gathering evidence. 4 The Court later applied this exclusionary rule
to the states as well. 5 Since the Weeks decision, the Court has attempted
to clarify the scope of the exclusionary rule. 6
In United States v. Leon,'7 the Court considered whether the
exclusionary rule should apply to evidence obtained when officers conduct
a search in reasonable reliance on an ultimately invalid warrant. 8
Although the search in this case violated the Fourth Amendment because
of the invalid warrant, the Court held that the evidence obtained should not
have been excluded.' 9 The Court found that whether a person's Fourth
Amendment rights were violated was a separate issue from whether2 to
apply the exclusionary rule, 20 a rule which imposes great social costs. '
The Court found that these social costs should be balanced with the
potential deterrence benefits,22 and that the exclusionary rule should apply
only when its remedial objectives are best served. 23 Applying this
balancing test, the Court considered whether the connection between the
police misconduct and the evidence obtained was so attenuated that
applying the exclusionary rule would no longer serve the constitutional
11.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. See id. at 393 (stating that if the Court allowed illegally seized evidence to be used
against a defendant "the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment, declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution").
14. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) (stating that the
exclusionary rule protects the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment with its deterrence
benefits).
15. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained in a
search or seizure contrary to the Fourth Amendment should be excluded in state, as well as federal,
criminal proceedings).
16. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06 (discussing the Court's evolving understanding ofthe
exclusionary rule).
17. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
18. Id. at 900. The District Court for the Central District of California determined that the
supporting affidavit, which contained police observations of the respondents, was insufficient to
establish probable cause. Id. at 900, 902-03.
19. Id. at 905.
20. Id. at 906 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)).
21. The Court stated that the exclusionary rule's substantial costs result from the fact that the
guilty "may go free or receive reduced sentences" due to suppression of evidence against them. Id.
at 907.
22. See supranote 14 and accompanying text.
23. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
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principles it was designed to protect.24 When such attenuation exists, trial
courts may decline to apply the exclusionary rule.25
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stressed the provisional
nature of the exclusionary rule's effect. 26 He stated that the impact of
exclusionary rule decisions will be tested by real-life police enforcement,
and that these decisions may be revisited if needed. 27 The scope of the rule,
Justice Blackmun asserted, is thus always subject to change with judicial
understanding of the rule's effects.2"
2 9 the Court reiterated its
Six years later, in New York v. Harris,
conclusion in Leon that the exclusionary rule does not apply to everything
that might deter illegal searches.30 In Harris, officers entered the
respondent's residence to make an arrest. 3' The arresting officers,
however, entered respondent's home without consent and without a
warrant, an established violation of the Fourth Amendment. 32 After the
illegal arrest, the respondent signed a written inculpatory statement at the
police station.33 The statement was ruled admissible evidence, and
respondent was convicted. 34 The New York Court of Appeals reversed and
ruled that the inculpatory statement should have been excluded as the fruit
of an illegal search. 35 The Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court
of Appeals' decision.36
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the purpose of the rule
against such entries.37 It found that the rule's purpose was to protect the

24. Id. at 911 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring
in part)). Even if there was some police misconduct, if that misconduct was attenuated from the
evidence obtained, imposing the social costs of the exclusionary rule may not be justified. Id.
25. Seeid. at911,913.
26. Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
30. See id. at 20.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 15-16; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,602-03 (1980) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment requires officers to obtain an arrest warrant before making an arrest in the
home).
.33. Harris,495 U.S. at 16. The respondent signed the inculpatory statement roughly one hour
after he was arrested illegally. Id. at 24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The officers may have chosen not
to obtain a warrant before making the arrest because under New York's right-to-counsel laws, their
chances of questioning the respondent without an attorney were greater if they did not first have
an arrest warrant. Alan C. Yarcusko, Note, Brown to Payton to Harris: A Fourth Amendment
Double Play by the Supreme Court,43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 253, 254 (1992).
34. Harris,495 U.S. at 16. Respondent was convicted of second-degree murder. Id.
35. Id. at 16-17.
36. Id. at 17, 21.
37. Id. at 17.
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integrity of the home-not statements made to police outside the home.38
For example, if the police had collected evidence inside the house after
their illegal entry, that evidence would have been excluded.3 9 However, the
rule's purpose of protecting the integrity of the home would not be served
by excluding a statement made elsewhere." Therefore, the Court held that
the exclusionary rule does not apply to a statement made outside a home
after an illegal in-home arrest.4 '
Five years after Harris,the Court decided another Fourth Amendment
case, Wilson v. Arkansas.42 In Wilson, the Court dealt with the commonlaw knock-and-announce rule after officers with a warrant identified
themselves as they entered an unlocked residence to search for drugs.4 3
The Court concluded that the knock-and-announce rule, which normally
required officers to knock and announce their presence before entering the
location of a search," formed part of the reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment.45 In reaching this decision, the Court considered the
common-law justifications for the rule: protecting the home from
destruction and preventing surprised residents from attacking officers. 46
38. Id.
39. Id. at 20. The Court stated that excluding evidence gained directly from the illegal arrest
would serve to vindicate the arrest-in-home rule from Payton.Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 21.
42. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
43. Id. at 929. Officers discovered both drugs and a firearm inside the petitioner's residence.
Id. Officers also found the petitioner flushing marijuana down the toilet. Id. Officers then arrested
the petitioner and charged him with delivery and possession of marijuana, delivery of
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 929-30. He was found guilty of all
charges and sentenced to thirty-two years in prison. Id. at 930.
44. Neither the Court nor the common law ever required officers to knock and announce their
presence in all circumstances. Id. at 934. On the contrary, because the common-law rule was based,
in part, on the idea that harm and destruction would be minimized by knocking and announcing
before entering, the rule would not apply if the opposite was true in a situation. Id. at 935-36. Along
with this threat-of-danger exception, the Court also stated that the knock-and-announce rule would
not apply when officers pursue an escaped prisoner or when there is a risk that evidence will be
destroyed if police officers announce themselves before entering. Id. at 936; see also Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385,394 (1997) (declaring that an officer must have reasonable suspicion that
adhering to the knock-and-announce rule would be dangerous, futile, or lead to the destruction of
evidence for a no-knock entry to be acceptable).
45. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 930.
46. Id. at 931-33. The common law presumed that if people had notice that officers were
entering their homes, citizens would obey the law and not resist the officers' efforts. Id.at 931-32. The
Court stated that the knock-and-announce rule may date back as far as 1275 in English law. Id. at 932
n.2. The Framers of the Constitution probably considered the knock-and-announce rule part of the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test because it was such a common rule with a long history. Id.
at 934. See generally Todd Witten, Note, Wilson v. Arkansas: Thirty Years after Ker the Supreme
CourtAddresses the Knock andAnnounce Issue, 29 AKRON L. REV. 447,449-57 (1996) (providing
a detailed history of the knock-and-announce rule throughout English and American law).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss2/6

4

Mattern: Constitutional Law: Knock-And-Announce Violations and the Purpose

2007]

CASE COMMENT

However, unlike the decisions in Leon and Harris,the Court in Wilson
specifically declined to decide whether a knock-and-announce violation
implicates the exclusionary rule.47
More than a decade after Wilson, the Court in the instant case used the
analyses from Leon and Harris,among other cases, to confront finally the
issue of whether the exclusionary rule should apply to knock-andannounce violations.48 The majority reiterated the findings in Leon that the
exclusionary rule imposes profound social costs and should be used only
as a last resort.49 The instant Court rejected any notion that all Fourth
Amendment violations trigger the exclusionary rule." It cited the analysis
in Leon finding that the violation and the rule are separate issues. 5
The majority then focused on the belief that the penalties for a law's
violation must relate to the purpose of that law.52 The instant Court stated
that attenuation, as discussed in Leon,53 occurs when the interests of a law
are not served by suppressing evidence.54 The instant Court cited Harris
as an example: Because suppressing the illegally seized evidence in that
case did not serve the purpose of the law, the evidence was not excluded."
The instant Court did not reconsider the holding in Wilson and accepted
that the entry in the instant case violated the knock-and-announce rule.56
The instant Court did, however, examine the interests that the knock-andannounce rule is intended to protect.5 7 First, the Court discussed the
interest in protecting human life and limb.5 8 The Court reasoned that a
person surprised by sudden police entry might react violently.59 Second,
the knock-and-announce rule is designed to protect property. 60 Finally, the
instant Court recognized the interest in protecting the rights of people to

47. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 937 n.4. The question whether the exclusionaryrule should applywas
not addressed by the lower court and was not a part of the question on which the Court granted
certiorari. Id. Therefore, the Court declined to address the rule's application. Id.
48. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
49. Id. at 2163.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 2164 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)).
52. Id.
53. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911, 913 (1984).
54. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.
55. Id. at 2164-65 (citingNew York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14,20(1990)); seesupranotes 37-41

and accompanying text.
56. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. Michigan had already conceded that there was a knock-andannounce violation. Id.
57. Id. at2165.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. But see United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1998) (holding that a no-knock
entry does not require a higher standard than reasonable suspicion when property is destroyed
during the entry).
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prepare themselves for police intrusion."
The majority found that the knock-and-announce rule does not protect
an interest in shielding evidence from the government.62 The instant Court
remarked that while people have a right to privacy for themselves, their
homes, and their effects before a warrant is issued, that right does not
continue after police obtain a warrant.6 3 Because the interests implicated
in the instant case were the three knock-and-announce interests discussed
above and were, therefore, not related to the evidence obtained, the instant
Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply.'
After reaching this decision, the majority reasoned that the
exclusionary rule has never been used when the social costs of application
outweigh the deterrence benefits, as the instant Court believed they did in
this case." Also, the instant Court suggested other means to deter knockand-announce violations, such as civil lawsuits, which would be less costly
to society than suppression.' Finally, the plurality67 concluded by
comparing the instant case with three other cases, including Harris,in
which evidence obtained after an illegal entry was held not to be the fruit
of an illegal search.68

61. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165. For example, a person should have time to get out of bed or
to get dressed before officers enter to conduct a search. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The instant Court stated that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock-andannounce violations include the release of potentially dangerous criminals back into society and
a flood of litigation from criminal defendants viewing a knock-and-announce violation as a "getout-of-jail-free card." Id. at 2165-66. This might negatively affect police officers by causing them
to wait longer than necessary in order to prevent triggering the exclusionary rule. Id. at 2166. The
instant Court found that the deterrence benefits from applying the exclusionary rule to knock-andannounce violations would be minimal because officers with a warrant could not expect to obtain
more evidence simply by ignoring the knock-and-announce rule. Id.
66. Id. at 2167-68; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing that a state actor may be civilly
liable if that person deprives another of a constitutional right). The instant Court also suggested that
internal police discipline effectively deters knock-and-announce violations. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at
2168. But see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (finding that excluding evidence is the only
proven deterrent to police misconduct).
67. Justice Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, but disagreed that
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) and New York v. Harris,495 U.S. 14 (1990), were
as relevant as Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion, found them. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170-71
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Therefore, Justice Kennedy refused to join the part of Scalia's opinion
that addressed these cases. Id. at 2171.
68. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168-70 (majority opinion); see United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S.
65, 68-69 (1998) (finding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when officers broke a
window to enter the defendant's home to conduct a search); Harris, 495 U.S. at 20 (refusing to
apply the exclusionary rule to incriminating statements made outside of the home after an arrest-inhome violation); Segura,468 U.S. at 813-14 (finding that the exclusionary rule should not apply
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In a lengthy dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority for its
interest-based approach to the exclusionary rule.69 He asserted that
focusing on the underlying interests of the knock-and-announce rule
missed the point and lacked support.7" Instead, the dissent argued that the
deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule requires suppression of
evidence discovered during an unlawful search in all but two specific
circumstances. 7
With its decision, the instant Court narrows the scope of the
exclusionary rule in a way consistent with both past precedent and rational
public policy. 2 It places the rule's emphasis on the harm that results from
police misconduct.73 The Court in Harris already established that the
relationship between a law and the harm against which it was designed to
protect is relevant to whether the exclusionary rule should apply.74 The
instant Court solidified the importance of this relationship by determining
when the costly rule should be triggered.75 In doing so, it narrowed the
exclusionary rule's application to cases in which the harm that occurred
relates to the evidence seized.76
As Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion in Leon, the
exclusionary rule is a Court-made rule subject to change with the Court's
understanding about the rule's practical impact. 77 The instant Court
considered the severe impact that excluding evidence based on a knockand-announce violation would have on society.7" Its decision not to apply
the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations because the
implicated interests did not relate to the seizure of evidence is especially
logical in light of those potential impacts on society. 79 The Court should

when officers obtain a valid warrant after they enter a residence illegally).
69. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at2181.
71. Id. at 2175-76. First, the dissent recognized that the exclusionary rule should not apply
when its application would "not result in appreciable deterrence." Id. at 2175 (quoting United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). Second, the dissent argued that the exclusionary rule should
not apply when the issue is admissibility in non-criminal trials. Id. (citing Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole
v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998)). The dissent asserted that neither of these two exceptions was
present in the instant case, and therefore the exclusionary rule should apply. Id. at 2176.
72. See id. at 2163-65 (majority opinion).
73. Id. at 2166-67.
74. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990).
75. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165. The Court stated that "[s]ince the interests that were
violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable." Id.
76. Id.
77. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
78. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
79. See id.
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be free to revisit, clarify, and, at times, modify a rule that it created."0
Thus, the instant Court's decision ensures logical and careful use of the
exclusionary rule in practice. 8'
The interests that the instant Court states are protected by the knockand-announce rule are also mentioned in Wilson.82 These common-law
interests were central to the decision in that case to include the knock-andannounce rule as a part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test.83
Therefore, in the instant case, the majority's focus on these interests in
determining whether the exclusionary rule should be triggered has
support.84
To hold, as the dissent urges, that the interests underlying the
exclusionary rule are without importance would set a dangerous
precedent. 5 Common sense dictates that a rule's purpose is important to
its enforcement.8 ' The Court would adopt an overly expansive view of a
rule with significant consequences if it held that the exclusionary rule
applied even when the interest implicated does not relate to the seizure of
evidence.8 ' The instant Court correctly allows other deterrent measures,
which are more suitable for the interests knock-and-announce violations
implicate, to remedy those violations. 8 This decision both limits the use
that the Court
of the exclusionary rule and clarifies for future litigants
89
considers a rule's purpose important to its enforcement.
Furthermore, by focusing on the implicated interests and declining to
apply the exclusionary rule, the instant Court in no way belittles the
importance of the knock-and-announce rule. 90 Likewise, the Court in
Harrisdid not downplay the significance of the arrest-in-home rule when
it refused to exclude evidence obtained in a way that did not implicate that
rule's interests. 91 Instead, the Court in the instant case said that although

80. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
81. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.
82. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-32 (1995).
83. Id. at 930-31.
84. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
85. See id. at 2181-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 2165 (majority opinion).
87. See id.
88. Id. at2166-67.Seesupranote66 and accompanying text(discussing alternative deterrent
measures available).
89. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
90. See id Justice Kennedyemphasized in his concurring opinion that "[t]he Court's decision
should not be interpreted as suggesting that violations of the requirement are trivial or beyond the
law's concern." Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14,20 (1990). Instead, the Court maintained that the main
incentive for obeying the rule remained because evidence or statements obtained in the home after
an illegal entry could be suppressed. Id.
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the exclusionary rule should not be applied, the officers who violated the
Fourth Amendment may be subject to discipline or civil liability.92
The instant Court's confidence in other deterrent methods is practical. 93
As the instant Court notes, deterrent measures such as discipline within the
police force have been used effectively for other, arguably more serious,
offenses such as police brutality.94 Although the Court has been reluctant
in the past to depend on deterrent methods other than exclusion, 95 by doing
so this time, the Court shows an evolving faith in these methods. 96 Instead
of constraining itself to decades-old assumptions about access to litigation
and internal police disciplinary procedures, the Court effectively embraced
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Leon 97 and revisited these
assumptions. 98
By removing the exclusionary rule carrot in knock-and-announce
violation cases, the Court also effectively reduced the burden the court
system would have otherwise faced. 99 Indeed, considering that the knockand-announce rule requires officers to wait a reasonable amount of time
after announcing themselves before entering, it could be difficult to prove
in court exactly how long they waited.' 0 The instant Court's decision
reduces the burden on the courts to try to determine when the ramifications
of a mistake might be detrimental to society.' O' Both the knock-andannounce rule and the exclusionary rule remain important Fourth

92. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (finding that excluding evidence was the
only "effectively available" deterrent to police misconduct (citation omitted)).
96. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167. The instant Court states that if it were to hold exclusion
necessary here simply because exclusion was previously found to be necessary, it would be
"forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost
half a century ago." Id. But see Cathy Young, Op-Ed., Knocking on Door to Trouble, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 26, 2006, at All (arguing that the trend in police enforcement over the last fifty years
has actually been to become more militarized, not more respectful of a citizen's rights, and that
civil litigation would still be an ineffective deterrent to knock-and-announce violations).
97. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
98. The instant Court noted that laws allowing civil litigation against municipalities for
constitutional violations did not exist in the past. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167. Additionally, the
instant Court asserted that police forces have increasingly emphasised internal police discipline.
Id. at 2168.
99. See id. at 2166. The majority asserted that if it were to hold as the dissent urged, it would
open the flood gates to litigation from defendants claiming a knock-and-announce violation in the
search that led to their arrest. Id. at 2165-66.
100. Id. at 2166. The instant Court found that a reasonable wait time for the circumstances
would be difficult to determine in court, as would the actual amount of time officers waited. Id.
101. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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Amendment fixtures after the instant Court's decision.° 2 By narrowing the
scope of the exclusionary rule to apply only when the evidence excluded
implicates Fourth Amendment rights, the Court made a logical decision
supported by precedent and public policy."°3 Society will benefit from this
common-sense judgment and be safer as a whole."°

102. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165; supra note 90 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy
also emphasized in his concurring opinion that "the continued operation of the exclusionary rule,
as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt." Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
103. SeeHudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165 (majority opinion); see also Editorial, The Supreme Court
Allows a QuestionableSearch andSeizure, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), June 25, 2006, at 4H
(claiming that the instant Court's decision "injected some common sense" into the exclusionary rule
by preventing criminals from going free because of a technical knock-and-announce violation).
104. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166. Society will not fear that incriminating evidence will be
excluded against a potentially dangerous criminal because officers violated the knock-andannounce rule. See id. at 2165.
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